Wills & Trusts by Beyer, Gerry
SMU Annual Texas Survey





Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smuatxs
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Annual Texas
Survey by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation





I. INTESTACY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 466
A. ADOPTION BY ESTOPPEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 466
II. WILLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467
A. FORMALITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467
1. Overall Ceremony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467
2. Holographic Wills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467
B. INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468
1. Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468
2. “Common Disaster” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468
3. Ambiguity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 469
C. EXONERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 470
D. WILL CONTESTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471
1. Testamentary Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471
2. Undue Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 472
3. Suspect Surrounding Circumstances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 472
4. Improper Reason for Disinheritance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474
E. LOST WILLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474
F. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH INHERITANCE
RIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 475
III. ESTATE ADMINISTRATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477
A. VENUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477
B. MUNIMENT OF TITLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 478
C. IMPACT OF SURVIVOR’S HOMESTEAD ON PROPERTY
VALUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 479
D. ATTORNEY’S FEES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 479
1. Successful Admission to Probate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 479
2. Unsuccessful Admission to Probate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480
E. APPEALS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480
IV. TRUSTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 481
A. JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 481
B. LOST TRUST INSTRUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 482
C. REVOCATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 483
D. CONVEYANCE BY TRUSTEE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 483
* Governor Preston E. Smith Regents Professor of Law, Texas Tech University
School of Law. B.A., Eastern Michigan University; J.D., Ohio State University; LL.M. &
J.S.D., University of Illinois. The author gratefully acknowledges the excellent assistance of
Bailey McGowan, May 2018 J.D. Candidate, Texas Tech University School of Law, in the
preparation of this article.
465
466 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 3
V. OTHER ESTATE PLANNING MATTERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 484
A. POWER OF ATTORNEY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 484
B. ORAL GIFT OF REAL PROPERTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 485
VI. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 486
This article discusses judicial developments relating to the Texas law of
intestacy, wills, estate administration, trusts, and other estate planning
matters during the Survey period of December 1, 2015 through
November 30, 2016. The reader is warned that not all newly decided cases
during the Survey period are presented, and not all aspects of each case
are analyzed. You must read and study the full text of each case before
relying on it or using it as precedent. The discussion of most cases
includes a moral, that is, the important lesson to be learned from the case.
By recognizing situations that resulted in time-consuming and costly
litigation in the past, the reader may be able to reduce the likelihood of
the same situations arising with his or her clients.
I. INTESTACY
A. ADOPTION BY ESTOPPEL
The doctrine of adoption by estoppel, also called equitable adoption,
gives the person a status of child under Texas law even though no formal
adoption occurred.1 However, this doctrine is applicable only if the child
is a minor. As Dampier v. Williams2 holds, an adult may not be adopted
by estoppel. After the intestate died, Dampier, the appellant, claimed
that he was the intestate’s sole heir as his adopted-by-estoppel son.3 The
trial court rejected Dampier’s claim because the alleged acts of estoppel
occurred after Dampier reached age eighteen.4 Dampier appealed.5
The First Houston Court of Appeals affirmed.6 The court of appeals
recognized Dampier and the intestate had a very close father-son rela-
tionship for over thirty years.7 However, the relationship started when
Dampier was an adult so there was never a legal impediment to a formal
adoption.8 And, of course, the intestate could have executed a will in
Dampier’s favor.9 Accordingly, the intestate’s unperformed oral promise
to adopt Dampier did not operate to create a parent-child relationship by
estoppel.10 Every Texas case where adoption by estoppel was deemed to
1. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Eilers, 205 S.W.3d 637, 641 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006,
pet. denied); Spiers v. Maples, 970 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.);
Pope v. First Nat’l Bank in Dallas, 658 S.W.2d 764, 765 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1983, no writ).
2. 493 S.W.3d 118, 120 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
3. Id. at 120–21.
4. Id. at 121.
5. Id.
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In re Estate of Kam12 demonstrates the importance of an attorney-su-
pervised will execution ceremony. A sister sought to admit her father’s
will to probate.13 Her brother objected, arguing that this will, which com-
pletely excluded him, was invalid for lack of proper execution.14 The trial
court agreed and denied the probate application.15 The sister appealed.16
The El Paso Court of Appeals reversed and rendered judgment, admit-
ting the will to probate.17 The father prepared his will with the help of the
sister’s now ex-boyfriend, who was not an attorney, by using an Internet
form.18 At a UPS Store, the father executed the will in front of a notary
who then notarized the will, which included her signature.19 Later, two of
the sister’s friends witnessed the will.20 Neither witness saw the father
sign the will, and they did not see each other attest to the will.21 The first
witness was confident she attested in front of the father.22 However,
when the second witness attested, the father was not in the same room,
and thus, she was not a valid witness.23
Consistent with prior cases, the court of appeals held that the notary
could serve as the second witness to satisfy the two-witness requirement
for non-holographic wills under Estates Code Section 251.051.24 The
court of appeals rejected the brother’s claims that (1) witnesses need to
be able to describe the contents of the will; (2) the testator must sign the
will in the presence of the witnesses; and (3) the testator must speak at
length with the witnesses before they attest.25
2. Holographic Wills
An unwitnessed holographic will must be entirely in the handwriting of
the actual testator; a signature on a will handwritten by another person,
11. Id. at 122–23.
12. 484 S.W.3d 642 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, pet. denied).
13. Id. at 648.
14. Id. at 649.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 655.
18. Id. at 646.




23. Id. The court assumed without deciding that the second witness’s attestation testi-
mony was insufficient as a matter of law. Id. at 651.
24. Id. at 650–51.
25. Id. at 651.
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even a co-testator, is insufficient, as Lemus v. Aguilar26 demonstrates.
Partner A and Partner B signed an unwitnessed document that they des-
ignated as a will.27 Except for Partner B’s signature, the document was
wholly in Partner A’s handwriting.28 After Partner B died, both the trial
court and the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the document was
not Partner B’s valid will because it was unwitnessed and not wholly in
the deceased partner’s handwriting.29
B. INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION
1. Jurisdiction
Estate of Rhoades30 taught that once a proponent presents a will to the
court for probate, the court may construe the will even if it is not yet
admitted to probate. After the probate court set aside an order admitting
the testatrix’s will to probate, the court granted a summary judgment con-
struing the dispositive provisions of the will.31 The Fort Worth Court of
Appeals determined that the probate court nonetheless had jurisdiction
to construe the will and that its judgment was not merely an advisory
opinion.32
The court of appeals reported that there is “sparse case law” on
whether a will must be currently admitted to probate before the court
may construe it.33 However, the court of appeals explained that “in prac-
tice, Texas courts have construed wills under the [Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act] before, during, and after admitting the will to probate.”34
2. “Common Disaster”
Stephens v. Beard35 addressed the issue of whether a murder-suicide
would be considered as a common disaster even if the order of death can
be determined. A husband murdered his wife and immediately shot him-
self, but he did not die until a few hours later.36 Each of the spouse’s wills
provided for legacies to nine named individuals if they died in a common
disaster or if their death order could not be determined.37 The trial court
determined that the legacies were effective because the spouses died in a
common disaster.38
26. 491 S.W.3d 51, 56 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.).
27. Id. at 54.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 56, 62.
30. 502 S.W.3d 406, 411 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. filed).
31. Id. at 409–10.
32. Id. at 415.
33. Id. at 410.
34. Id. at 411.
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The Tyler Court of Appeals affirmed.39 The court of appeals held that
the murder-suicide was a common disaster because the husband fired
both the murder and suicide gunshots in one episode.40 The court of ap-
peals determined it was irrelevant to the classification of the event as a
common disaster that the husband “did not successfully kill himself im-
mediately” even though he lived almost two hours longer than his wife.41
On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court reversed without even giving the
parties the opportunity to present oral arguments.42 The supreme court
focused on the well-recognized legal meaning of the term “common dis-
aster,” which means that the two parties “die at very nearly the same
time, with no way of determining the order of their deaths.”43 The su-
preme court held that the spouses did not die in a common disaster be-
cause, although their deaths were temporally close, the order of their
deaths was known with certainty.44
3. Ambiguity
Wills granting interests in oil and gas properties need to be carefully
drafted to assure that the interests being conveyed comport with the tes-
tator’s intent. Prudent practice is to consult with an oil and gas expert
when phrasing the terms of the grant, and, when describing a specific gift,
make certain the drafter describes what the testator really means; other-
wise, problems may arise like those in the Texas Supreme Court case of
Hysaw v. Dawkins.45 In that case, the testatrix devised surface rights to
tracts of land of different acreage to each of her three children.46 The
children also received the mineral rights, but the testatrix subjected those
rights to royalty interests.47 After all the children died, the grandchildren
fought over one of the children’s royalty interests described as “an undi-
vided one-third (1/3) of an undivided one-eighth (1/8) of all oil, gas or
other minerals in or under or that may be produced from any of [the
tracts].”48 One group of descendants argued that the will granted a frac-
tional royalty to each child (1/24 fixed royalty each), and another group
argued that the will required the children to share all royalties equally (1/
3 floating royalty each).49 In other words, the supreme court decided
whether double fractions must be multiplied and the royalty interest
fixed without regard to the royalty negotiated in a future mineral
lease (fractional royalty) or whether 1/8 was intended as a synonym
39. Stephens v. Beard, 428 S.W.3d 385, 386 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2014), rev’d, 485 S.W.3d
914 (Tex. 2016).
40. Id. at 388.
41. Id.
42. Stephens, 485 S.W.3d at 918.
43. Id. at 916.
44. Id. at 917–18.
45. 483 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2016).
46. Id. at 4.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 6.
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for the landowner’s royalty, meaning the interest conveyed varies de-
pending on the royalty actually obtained in a future mineral lease
(fraction of royalty).50
Was the testatrix trying to determine whether the fraction of 1/8th really
meant 1/8th, or if it meant whatever royalty had been negotiated?51 The
trial court held that the royalties were to be shared equally.52
In Dawkins v. Hysaw, the San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that the will was unambiguous in giving one child a surface and
mineral estate subject to a fixed-fraction royalty to each of the other two
children.53 The court of appeals engaged in an extensive discussion of the
difference between fractional royalties (constant or fixed fraction of pro-
duction) and fraction of royalty interests (floating fraction of whatever
royalty interest is reserved in the lease).54 The court of appeals deter-
mined that different children received different types of interests, thus
rejecting the argument that the testatrix actually intended for all children
to share all royalties equally.55 The court of appeals explained that even if
she may have intended the children to share equally, the court is bound
by the unambiguous words of her devises.56 An appeal to the Texas Su-
preme Court followed.
The supreme court reversed.57 The supreme court focused on ascer-
taining the testatrix’s intent from the four corners of the instrument “by a
careful and detailed examination of the document in its entirety, rather
than by application of mechanical rules of construction that offer cer-
tainty at the expense of effectuating intent.”58 Using this holistic ap-
proach, the supreme court then determined that the testatrix’s will
demonstrated her intent for each of her children to receive equal royalty
interests.59
C. EXONERATION
In re Estate of Heider60 serves as a reminder that whenever a testator
makes a specific gift of property, the will should expressly address the
issue of exoneration. The testatrix’s will made a specific devise of land to
her son.61 The land was subject to a secured debt.62 A dispute arose be-
tween her son and the remainder beneficiary regarding whether the debt
50. Id. at 4.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 6.
53. Dawkins v. Hysaw, 450 S.W.3d 147, 149 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014), rev’d, 483
S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2016).
54. Id. at 153–57.
55. Id. at 157.
56. Id. at 156.
57. Hysaw v. Dawkins, 483 S.W.3d 1, 16 (Tex. 2016).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 496 S.W.3d 118 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, no pet.).
61. Id. at 120.
62. Id.
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should be exonerated by other estate property not specifically devised.63
The trial court ruled in favor of the son that a portion of the debt secured
by specific devise is to be exonerated.64 The remainder beneficiary
appealed.65
The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed.66 The court of appeals began its
analysis by examining Estates Code Sections 255.301 and 255.302, which
set forth a presumption that a specific gift passes subject to secured debts
unless the will expressly provides otherwise.67 The court of appeals re-
jected the son’s claim that the devise, which made no mention of how a
secured debt was to be handled, specifically stated that it should be exon-
erated.68 The court of appeals also rejected the son’s claim that a will
provision granting the executor the ability to transfer property subject to




Estate of Koontz clarifies that a summary judgment that a testator had
testamentary capacity is improper when there is “more than a scintilla of
evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact with regard to [the testa-
tor’s] testamentary capacity.”70 The beneficiary of a prior will attempted
to show that the testator lacked capacity when he executed a new will
revoking the previous will that had named him as the beneficiary.71 The
trial court granted the executor of the new will a no-evidence motion for
summary judgment and awarded attorney’s fees against the beneficiary of
the prior will.72
The appellate court reversed.73 The San Antonio Court of Appeals ex-
amined the evidence, especially the affidavit of the beneficiary of the
prior will and the testimony of the attorney who drafted the new will, and
determined that there was enough evidence to raise a fact question re-
garding the testator’s capacity.74 For example, the testator believed his
wife of over fifty years was having an affair, he attempted to lease prop-
erty he no longer owned, he suffered from bipolar disorder, and he had
attempted suicide.75
63. Id. at 121.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 124.
67. Id. at 122–23.
68. Id. at 123.
69. Id.
70. Estate of Koontz, No. 04-15-00820-CV, 2016 WL 6775593, at *2 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio Nov. 16, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
71. Id. at *1.
72. Id.
73. Id. at *3.
74. Id. at *2.
75. Id.
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2. Undue Influence
Evidence of undue influence must show that the testator’s free will was
supplanted by that of the influencer; mere opportunity to do so is insuffi-
cient, as shown in In re Estate of Kam,76 in which a sister sought to admit
her father’s will to probate. Her brother objected, arguing that this will,
which completely excluded him, was invalid because of undue influ-
ence.77 The trial court agreed and denied the probate application.78 The
sister appealed.79
The El Paso Court of Appeals reversed, explaining that “means, mo-
tive, and opportunity are not enough to show undue influence as a matter
of law.”80 The court of appeals explained that there was insufficient evi-
dence to support a finding that the father was unable to make his own
decisions about the passage of property upon his death.81 The court of
appeals recognized that the sister influenced her father to execute his will
and that he was unlikely to have signed his new will without her influ-
ence.82 However, the brother did not present legally or factually sufficient
evidence to show that his sister overwhelmed their father’s free agency.83
The evidence showed that the father was a “strong-willed[,] . . . mentally
‘sharp’” man who drove his own car and lived a mostly independent
life.84 Merely because the father excluded one child from the will is not
evidence of undue influence.85
3. Suspect Surrounding Circumstances
In re Estate of Parrimore86 teaches that a testator should consult with
an attorney when executing a will rather than using a computer program
and then throwing a will execution party. The testator and his wife
worked together on the testator’s will using a computer program that pre-
pared his will according to his answers to questions generated by the
software, which included an express provision that he was intentionally
omitting his two children.87 Sometime thereafter, the testator suffered a
stroke and was hospitalized for three days.88 Eleven days after being dis-
charged, the testator had a will signing party at his home attended by
family members and friends.89 After socializing with the guests and
76. 484 S.W.3d 642, 652 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, pet. denied).
77. Id. at 645.
78. Id. at 649.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 652.
81. Id.




86. No. 14-14-00820-CV, 2016 WL 750293 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 25,
2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
87. Id. at *2.
88. Id. at *1.
89. Id. at *2.
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shooting pool, the will execution ceremony took place.90 One of the
guests, a notary, testified that the testator asked his wife to sign the will
for him and that three witnesses attested to the will in the testator’s pres-
ence.91 During the months that followed, the testator continued his ther-
apy, was able to drive, and even went back to work.92 About a year after
the will execution ceremony, the testator died.93
The testator’s wife filed the will for probate and the testator’s children
contested, alleging that the testator lacked testamentary intent and testa-
mentary capacity, in addition to being under his wife’s undue influence.94
The trial court heard the testimony of the people at the will party and
admitted the will to probate.95 The testator’s children appealed.96
The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals affirmed.97 First, the court
of appeals examined the document itself, such as being labeled as a “last
will and testament,” providing for the disposition of his property, and
naming an executor.98 The court of appeals held this was sufficient to
support the trial court’s implied finding that the testator had testamen-
tary intent.99
Second, the court of appeals examined the evidence that supposedly
demonstrated that the testator lacked testamentary capacity.100 The court
of appeals recognized that the testator’s stroke shortly before executing
the will could raise a question about his capacity.101 However, there was
ample testimony from individuals present at the will execution party who
swore that the testator appeared to be of sound mind and that he knew
he was executing a will.102
Third, the court of appeals determined that there was insufficient evi-
dence to set aside the will on the basis of undue influence.103 Although
there was circumstantial evidence that the wife could have exerted undue
influence, such as being named as the sole beneficiary to the exclusion of
his children and participating in the preparation and execution of the will,
there was insufficient evidence that she actually exerted any undue influ-
ence.104 Merely having the opportunity to exert such influence does not






95. Id. at *2–4.
96. Id. at *4.
97. Id. at *12.
98. Id. at *6.
99. Id. at *7.
100. Id.
101. See id. at *7–8
102. Id. at *8.
103. Id. at *10.
104. Id. at *9.
105. Id.
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4. Improper Reason for Disinheritance
A will contestant attempting to set aside a will or gift in the will on
public policy grounds needs to point to express terms of the will which
violate public policy. For example, in Merrick v. Helter,106 the testator’s
will expressly disinherited a daughter. After the probate court admitted
the will to probate, the daughter contested the will, claiming that the tes-
tator’s motive for excluding her violated public policy, thus making the
will invalid.107 She claimed that the testator had abused her sexually and
that disinheriting her was his vengeance when she confronted him about
the abuse many decades later.108 The executor responded that these
claims against the testator were unsubstantiated and brought only in an
attempt to obtain property from the estate.109 The probate court dis-
missed the daughter’s claim without reaching the merits of the claim be-
cause even if true, it would not provide her with a viable basis for setting
aside the will.110 The daughter appealed.111
The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed.112 The court of appeals ex-
amined the daughter’s claim that terms in a will may be unenforceable on
public policy grounds.113 For example (this author’s, not the court’s), if a
testator stated, “I leave Daughter $10,000 if you cut off my ex-wife’s right
hand,” such a provision would not be enforceable. Agreeing, of course,
that Texas public policy condemns sexual abuse and related conduct, the
court of appeals explained that nothing in the will addressed this topic.114
The daughter’s “challenge is grounded entirely in asserted conditions or
limitations that appear nowhere in the will’s text.”115 The court of appeals
also emphasized that the daughter had no right or entitlement to an in-
heritance.116 A testator may disinherit an heir for any reason, be it just or
unjust.117
E. LOST WILLS
Woods v. Kenner118 demonstrated some of the problems that may arise
when the decedent’s will is not timely located. After the decedent’s death,
his two children were declared to be his sole heirs.119 Thereafter, they
sold certain property to a purchaser.120 Later, a copy of the decedent’s
106. 500 S.W.3d 671 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, pet. denied).





112. Id. at 676.
113. Id. at 673–75.
114. Id. at 674.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 675.
117. Id. at 675–76.
118. 501 S.W.3d 185 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. withdrawn).
119. Id. at 188.
120. Id.
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will, which devised his property to his two children and his two step-chil-
dren, was located.121 The probate court admitted the will to probate as a
muniment of title, accepting the explanation that the original could not
be found because it was destroyed by Hurricane Ike.122 The probate court
also granted a bill of review setting aside the previous heirship
determination.123
The First Houston Court of Appeals affirmed.124 First, the court of ap-
peals determined that the probate court’s granting of the bill of review
was proper, rejecting a claim that a petition for a bill of review must make
“a prima facie showing of a meritorious claim or defense.”125 Instead, all
that is necessary is to show “substantial error” in the prior decision.126
This was the case here because the original order stated that the decedent
died intestate, which was not true.127
Second, the court of appeals determined there was sufficient evidence
to support the probate court’s determination that the decedent did not
revoke his will and instead that the original was destroyed by the massive
flooding of his house that the hurricane caused.128
Interestingly, the case does not address the purchaser’s unfortunate sit-
uation, even though the purchaser was the unsuccessful appellant.129 Is
the purchaser a bona fide purchaser from sellers who, at the time of the
sale, were the legal title holders to the property? If not, would title insur-
ance cover the purchaser’s loss of fifty percent of the property? Will title
insurance companies now refuse to insure sales from heirs, at least until
the time to file a bill of review has run, fearing that a later will may be
found?
F. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH INHERITANCE RIGHTS
At least since the 1987 case of King v. Acker,130 Texas lawyers have
conducted themselves as if Texas recognizes a cause of action for tortious
inference with inheritance rights. Two recent cases, Jackson Walker, LLP
v. Kinsel131 and Anderson v. Archer,132 have shocked Texas estate liti-
gators by holding that Texas has yet to recognize the tort because there is
no Texas Supreme Court case or legislation that expressly so provides.
On May 26, 2017, the Texas Supreme Court issued its opinion affirming
121. Id. at 189.
122. Id. at 190.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 199.
125. Id. at 191.
126. Id. at 193.
127. Id. at 194.
128. Id. at 197–98.
129. See id. at 199
130. 725 S.W.2d 750, 754 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ).
131. No. 07-13-00130-CV, 2015 WL 2085220, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 10, 2015,
pet. granted) (mem. op.).
132. 490 S.W.3d 175, 176 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, pet. filed).
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the Amarillo Court of Appeals in Jackson Walker.133 The supreme court
refused to recognize a cause of action for tortious interference with inher-
itance rights but left open the issue for later cases as the court stated, “we
are not persuaded to consider it here.”134
In Jackson Walker LLP v. Kinsel, a jury found that the defendants
were liable for tortiously interfering with the Kinsels’ inheritance
rights.135 The trial court then awarded damages as well as other remedies
in an attempt to undo the interference.136 The defendants appealed not
on the ground that their conduct was not tortious, but rather that the tort
is not recognized as a cause of action.137
The appellate court agreed and reversed.138 The court of appeals based
its holding on the fact that neither the Texas Supreme Court nor the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals have expressly recognized the tort.139
The strong dissent pointed out that six of the Texas intermediate appel-
late courts have previously recognized the tort, including the Amarillo
Court of Appeals.140 Additionally, six other courts, including the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals, discussed the tort, assuming it was a valid cause
of action.141
Surprisingly, neither opinion cited to Estates Code Section 54.001,
which, in this author’s opinion, impliedly provides legislative recognition
of the tort. In relevant part, this section states, “[t]he filing or contesting
in probate court of a pleading relating to a decedent’s estate does not
constitute tortious interference with inheritance of the estate.”142 Why
would the legislature say something cannot be tortious interference if
Texas does not recognize the tort in the first place?
In Anderson v. Archer,143 the jury determined that the defendant tor-
tiously interfered with the plaintiffs’ rights to inherit from their uncle, and
the trial court awarded over $2.5 million in damages. The defendant
appealed.144
The Austin Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Texas does not rec-
ognize a cause of action for tortious interference with inheritance.145 The
court of appeals conducted a detailed review of the numerous Texas cases
133. Kinsel v. Lindsey, No. 15-0403, 2017 Tex. LEXIS 477 (Tex. May 26, 2017).
134. Id. at *3 (emphasis added).
135. Jackson Walker, 2015 WL 2085220, at *3.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at *19.
139. Id. at *3. The Texas Supreme Court transferred the case from the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals to the Amarillo Court of Appeals as part of its docket equalization ef-
forts. Id.
140. Id. at *20 (Pirtle, J., dissenting). The San Antonio, Amarillo, El Paso, Waco, and
both Houston Courts of Appeals have recognized the tort. Id.
141. Id. at *21. The Fort Worth, Austin, Texarkana, Beaumont, Tyler, and Corpus
Christi Courts of Appeals have not expressly rejected the tort. Id.
142. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 54.001(a) (West 2014).
143. 490 S.W.3d 175, 175–76 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, pet. filed).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 176.
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discussing tortious interference and determined that although they may
have discussed the tort, they never actually recognized it.146 The court of
appeals also refused to interpret Estates Code Section 54.001147 as a legis-
lative admission that the tort exists merely because this provision pro-
vides that filing or contesting a will is not tortious interference.148 The
court of appeals then explained that express legislative action or a deci-
sion of the Texas Supreme Court is needed to recognize the tort.149
The court of appeals also noted that the plaintiffs had already received
the property with which they alleged the defendant tortiously inter-
fered.150 The main component of their damages was not the recovery of
the uncle’s property, but rather attorneys’ fees incurred to receive their
inheritance.151 Thus, the plaintiffs were actually using the tort “as a fee-
shifting mechanism” to recover fees otherwise unrecoverable because
Texas follows the American Rule that the winning party cannot recover
attorneys’ fees unless authorized by statute.152
III. ESTATE ADMINISTRATION
A. VENUE
An estate debtor lacks standing to request a court to transfer a probate
proceeding from a county of improper venue to a county of proper venue.
For example, in In re Davidson,153 the executor sued a debtor of the de-
cedent who was in default on a real estate lien note in Anderson County
after the decedent’s death but prior to being appointed. Shortly thereaf-
ter, the executor was successful in obtaining an order in Anderson
County admitting the will to probate and appointing him as the executor,
even though the decedent was domiciled in San Augustine County at the
time of his death.154 The debtor filed a motion to transfer the probate
proceeding to San Augustine County.155 The trial court refused, and the
debtor sought mandamus.156
The Tyler Court of Appeals denied mandamus relief.157 The court of
appeals acknowledged that mandatory venue was in San Augustine
County, the decedent’s domicile at death under Estates Code Section
33.001(1).158 However, only an “interested person” has standing to re-
quest a transfer of venue under Estates Code Section 33.102(a).159 The
146. Id. at 176–79.
147. § 54.001.
148. Anderson, 490 S.W.3d at 178.
149. Id. at 177.
150. Id. at 178.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 179.
153. 485 S.W.3d 927, 929 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2016, orig. proceeding).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 929–30.
157. Id. at 932.
158. Id. at 930.
159. Id.
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court of appeals held that the debtor was not an interested person as
defined by Estates Code Section 22.018(1).160 First, the debtor was not a
creditor of the estate; the debtor owed money to the estate rather than
being entitled to money from the estate.161 Second, the debtor’s claim
that the executor violated the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Pro-
tection Act by filing in the wrong county did not make her a creditor of
the decedent’s estate, but instead, merely a potential creditor of the exec-
utor.162 Thus, the court of appeals denied mandamus and held that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the debtor’s motion
to transfer venue.163
B. MUNIMENT OF TITLE
A person dissatisfied with a court admitting a will to probate as a muni-
ment of title must either timely appeal or file a bill of review if the person
wishes to have a personal representative appointed to administer the es-
tate. For example, in In re Jacky, the probate court admitted the testator’s
will to probate as a muniment of title.164 After three and a half years
elapsed, the probate court reopened the estate and appointed an inde-
pendent executor so the executor could pursue potential claims due to
the testator’s estate.165 A writ of mandamus was sought on the basis that
the order admitting the will to probate as a muniment of title was a final
order, and thus, the probate court lacked plenary power to reopen the
estate.166
The First Houston Court of Appeals conditionally granted mandamus,
stating that the probate court’s order was void, as its plenary power had
already expired.167 The court of appeals explained that the muniment of
title order was final and that the two-year period to file a bill of review
under Estates Code Section 55.251 elapsed prior to the probate court’s
appointment of an executor.168 The court of appeals rejected the argu-
ment that the estate did not actually close because of the potential claim,
because to accept that proposition would mean “no estate in which a will
is admitted to probate as a muniment of title could ever close because
there always exists the possibility that an unknown claim needing admin-
istration might remain and might not come to light until later.”169
160. Id.at 930–32.
161. Id.at 932.
162. Id. at 931.
163. Id. at 932.
164. In re Jacky, 506 S.W.3d 550, 552 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, orig.
proceeding).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 554.
167. Id. at 558.
168. Id. at 555–56.
169. Id. at 557.
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C. IMPACT OF SURVIVOR’S HOMESTEAD ON PROPERTY VALUE
Estate of Sloan170 restates the principle that a surviving spouse’s home-
stead right reduces the fair market value of the homestead property. A
husband and his wife established a homestead on property that was the
wife’s separate property.171 Upon the wife’s death, her husband was ap-
pointed as the independent executor of her will, which gave him the right
to purchase property in his wife’s estate at fair market value. He later did
so by conveying his interest in $222,000 of property in his wife’s estate.172
After the husband’s death, an attempt was made to show that he had
violated his fiduciary duty by purchasing the property for less than its fair
market value.173 The trial court agreed, finding that the husband’s home-
stead interest had no effect on the fair market value of the property.174
On appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed.175 The court of
appeals explained that the husband’s right as a surviving spouse to occupy
the homestead for the rest of his life (unless he abandons the property)
under Article XVI, Section 52 of the Texas Constitution reduces the
amount a willing seller would pay for the remainder interest “left over”
after the husband’s homestead right, which is akin to a life estate.176
D. ATTORNEY’S FEES
1. Successful Admission to Probate
In re Estate of Kam177 explains that a successful will applicant is enti-
tled to reasonable attorney’s fees and whether the applicant acted in good
faith or with just cause is irrelevant. In this case, a sister sought to admit
her father’s will to probate.178 Her brother objected, arguing that this
will, which completely excluded him, was invalid, either for lack of proper
execution or undue influence.179 The trial court agreed and denied the
probate application.180 In addition, the trial court denied the sister’s at-
torney’s fees, determining that she did not act in good faith or with just
cause.181 The sister appealed.182
The El Paso Court of Appeals reversed.183 Because the court of ap-
peals ordered that the father’s will be admitted to probate, the sister
170. 496 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. denied).
171. Id. at 301.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 302.
174. Id. at 304.
175. Id. at 311.
176. Id. at 305–07. The court of appeals did not need to determine the amount of the
decrease in value because the parties agreed that if the husband’s homestead right lowered
the value of the property, then the husband’s estate was not liable. Id. at 308–09.
177. 484 S.W.3d 642, 655 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, pet. denied).
178. Id. at 648.




183. Id. at 655.
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“conclusively established that her application was brought in good faith
and with just cause.”184 In fact, the good faith and just cause analysis is
irrelevant when the will is actually admitted to probate.185 Accordingly,
the sister was entitled to her attorney’s fees under Estates Code Section
352.052.186
2. Unsuccessful Admission to Probate
A party alleging entitlement to attorney fees should consistently re-
quest them in all pleadings. Failure to do so may cause issues, such as
those in Estate of Wright.187 After the probate court admitted the testa-
tor’s will to probate, a contestant attempted to probate a different docu-
ment as the testator’s will.188 Although the contestant’s attempt failed,
the trial court allowed the contestant to recover attorney’s fees from the
testator’s estate for attempting to probate the alternate will.189 The inde-
pendent executor appealed.190
The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals affirmed.191 The court of
appeals determined that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial
court’s holding that the contestant’s attempt to probate the alternate will
was in good faith, and thus, the contestant was entitled to attorney’s fees
under what is now Estates Code Section 352.052.192 The court of appeals
rejected the independent executor’s assertion (accepted by the dissent)193
that the award was not supported by proper pleadings or tried by con-
sent.194 Instead, the court of appeals stated that, although the contestant
did not request attorney’s fees in live pleadings at the time of the trial, he
did present evidence of those fees at the end of the trial and filed a mo-
tion for entry of a judgment awarding the fees.195 The court of appeals
also explained that the independent executor was not surprised by the
request, and in fact, the independent executor had the opportunity to
cross-examine the attorney about her fees.196
E. APPEALS
1. Removal of Personal Representative
A judgment removing a personal representative from office is a final
judgment for appellate purposes. Failure to recognize this basic principle
184. Id.
185. Id. (citing Miller v. Anderson, 651 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tex. 1983)).
186. Id. at 654–55.
187. 482 S.W.3d 650 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied).
188. Id. at 652.
189. Id. at 655.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 661.
192. Id. at 659.
193. Id. at 661 (Frost, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 660–61.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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may cause problems such as those found in Estate of Davidson.197 The
probate court appointed co-executors of the testator’s estate.198 Later, a
beneficiary of the will petitioned the court to remove the co-executors
from office and to recover damages, costs, and attorney’s fees.199 The
probate court granted the motion to remove the co-executors and there-
after appointed the beneficiary as the dependent administrator with the
will annexed.200 Over one year later, one of the removed co-executors
challenged the court’s order removing him from office.201 The removed
co-executor then moved for a new trial, and the probate court denied the
motion.202 An appeal followed.203
The Dallas Court of Appeals instructed the parties to address the issue
of whether the original removal order was appealable.204 The court of
appeals then held that the order was final205 and rejected the removed co-
executor’s claim that it was not final because there were still related
claims pending in the underlying probate action.206 The court of appeals
explained that the Texas law is clear that an order removing a personal
representative is appealable, as it adjudicates a substantial right.207
IV. TRUSTS
A. JURISDICTION
When suing a foreign corporate fiduciary, the plaintiff must be certain
to recite the applicable jurisdictional facts and carefully proofread cita-
tions to the Estates Code, as reflected in U.S. Bank v. TFHSP LLC Series
6481.208 A beneficiary sued the trustee, a foreign corporation, and re-
ceived a no-answer default judgment.209 The trustee appealed.210 The
Fort Worth Court of Appeals examined the pleadings and determined
that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over the trustee because
the beneficiary’s service of process was invalid.211
The court of appeals focused on Estates Code Sections 505.001–.006,
which govern service of process on foreign corporate fiduciaries.212 The
beneficiary’s petition did not cite the proper Estates Code section, nor
did it sufficiently allege “jurisdictional facts,” such as the trustee’s status
197. See No. 05-15-00432-CV, 2016 WL 4254487 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 11, 2016, no
pet.) (mem. op.).







205. Id. at *3.
206. Id. at *2.
207. Id.
208. 487 S.W.3d 715, 720 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, no pet.).
209. Id. at 717.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 720.
212. Id. at 718.
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as a foreign corporate fiduciary under the statute.213 The court of appeals
explained that jurisdictional facts cannot be inferred from the trustee’s
name as found in the petition.214
B. LOST TRUST INSTRUMENT
The existence and terms of a trust may be proven with competent evi-
dence when the original instrument has been lost or destroyed. For exam-
ple, in Gause v. Gause,215 the settlor created an inter vivos trust in the
1940s, but the trust instrument disappeared shortly after the settlor’s
death in 1998. The settlor’s wife, a primary beneficiary of the trust,
claimed that a non-beneficiary child intentionally destroyed or lost the
trust instrument.216 In 2000, this non-beneficiary child convinced her
mother (the settlor’s wife), “who was in poor health,” to convey the trust
property to her “for a nominal consideration.”217 A few months later, the
settlor’s wife successfully sued her daughter to cancel the deed.218 Then,
in 2002, the settlor’s wife conveyed all of the trust property to another of
the non-beneficiary children.219 In 2007, one of the beneficiary children
successfully sued to set aside this conveyance and the settlor’s wife
appealed.220
The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting the settlor’s wife’s
claim that the trial court “erred in determining the existence and terms of
the Trust . . . based upon parol evidence.”221 The court of appeals ex-
plained that a trust instrument is not rendered ineffective merely because
it is lost or destroyed, so long as there is sufficient evidence to prove its
contents.222 In this case, the settlor’s wife swore to the terms of the trust
when she successfully set aside her 2000 deed.223 The court of appeals
also determined that Trust Code Section 112.004’s statute of frauds re-
quirement of a written and signed document “does not remove trust in-
struments from the operation of general rules relating to the proof of lost
documents.”224 In addition, the court of appeals explained that judicial
estoppel prevents the settlor’s wife from claiming she has no memory of
the trust when she earlier gave detailed sworn testimony about the trust
and its contents.225
213. Id. at 719.
214. Id. A concurring opinion points out that the beneficiary’s failure to reference the
proper section of the Estates Code appeared to be a mere typographical error. See id. at
722 n.1.
215. 496 S.W.3d 913 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, no pet.).





221. Id. at 916–17.
222. Id. at 917.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 918.
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C. REVOCATION
An inter vivos trust is a non-probate asset, and the property transferred
to the trust is governed by the terms of the trust, not a subsequent will,
unless the will can serve as a presently effective trust revocation following
the terms of the trust. For example, in Gordon v. Gordon,226 a husband
and his wife created a revocable trust, which required a revocation to be
in a signed, acknowledged writing delivered to the trustee. Thereafter,
they executed a joint will that provided that the will “override any prior
allocations described in trust documents.”227 After the husband’s death, a
dispute arose as to whether the property the couple had transferred to
the trust would be governed by the terms of the trust or the will.228 The
wife claimed that the trust controlled, and the executor of the husband’s
will contended that the will controlled.229 The trial court held that the will
provision did not act to revoke the trust, and thus, the trust assets pass
under the terms of the trust.230 The executor appealed.231
The Eastland Court of Appeals affirmed.232 The court of appeals ex-
plained that the language of the will addressing the disposition of prop-
erty was testamentary in nature, that is, it would take effect after death
even though the language revoking previous wills was effective immedi-
ately.233 The will did not contain a provision revoking the trust that com-
plied with the requirements for revocation set forth in the trust.234
D. CONVEYANCE BY TRUSTEE
To avoid confusion, a trustee who conveys a trust’s interest in real
property should clearly indicate the trustee’s capacity. For example, in
West 17th Resources, LLC v. Pawelek,235 the trustee signed a deed with-
out an express indication whether she was transferring the property in her
capacity as an individual beneficiary, as the trustee, or both. Thus, the
argument was made that the deed did not transfer the interest held in
trust.236 The San Antonio Court of Appeals concluded that no Texas au-
thority has held “that a grantor’s failure to specify her capacity either
‘individually’ or ‘as trustee’ nullifies a deed’s purported conveyance of
property that the grantor holds in trust.”237
Because all parties agreed that the deed was unambiguous, the court of
226. No. 11-14-00086-CV, 2016 WL 1274076 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 31, 2016, pet.
denied) (mem. op.).
227. Id. at *1.




232. Id. at *5.
233. Id. at *4.
234. Id.
235. 482 S.W.3d 690 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. denied).
236. Id. at 692.
237. Id. at 694.
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appeals construed the deed as a matter of law.238 The court of appeals
examined the deed’s granting clause, which stated that “all” of the subject
property was being conveyed subject only to a utility easement.239 The
only possible evidence of the trustee’s intent not to convey the trust’s
interest in the property was her failure to specify either an individual or
trust capacity when she signed the deed.240 The court of appeals refused
to imply a reservation of the trust interest from the deed’s coverage be-
cause doing so would conflict with the clear language of the deed convey-
ing all of the property.241
V. OTHER ESTATE PLANNING MATTERS
A. POWER OF ATTORNEY
In Wise v. Mitchell,242 a grandmother (the principal) transferred land to
her grandson—retaining a life estate, the authority to sell, and the power
to change the remainder owners (a “Lady Bird” deed). Her agent, under
a durable power of attorney, entered into a contract to sell the land; filed
a revocation of the original deed; and alternatively, appointed different
individuals as the remainder owners.243 The agent was later appointed as
the principal’s guardian and requested court permission to sell the prop-
erty.244 Before the trial court could rule on the motion, the principal
died.245 The agent was then appointed as the principal’s executor.246 A
protracted dispute arose between the grandson and the executor over the
land.247 After the executor prevailed, the grandson appealed.248
The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed.249 The court of appeals ex-
plained that the agent’s failure to file the durable power of attorney
before entering into the real property transaction did not impact the va-
lidity of the revocation.250 In addition, the statutory provision allegedly
violated by the agent was not part of Texas law, although it was part of
the model Uniform Power of Attorney Act, which Texas has not
adopted.251 The court of appeals also explained that the power of attor-
ney form did not comply with the statute, and thus, the agent’s powers
are fixed by the document’s own terms.252 The court of appeals deter-
238. Id. at 695.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. As an alternate ground for its decision, the court of appeals determined that
the grantees would have acquired title by adverse possession. Id. at 696.
242. No. 05-15-00610-CV, 2016 WL 3398447 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 20, 2016, pet. de-
nied) (mem. op.).




247. Id. at *2–4.
248. Id. at *4.
249. Id. at *10.
250. Id. at *7.
251. Id.
252. Id. at *8.
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mined that the language granting the agent the power to “perform any
and all acts in my stead and to do and perform all such other matters as
may be necessary and expedient for the purpose of carrying out the ob-
jects above mentioned” was sufficient to authorize the agent to revoke
the deed.253
The facts in the case occurred prior to the enactment of the Texas Real
Property Transfer on Death Act.254 Although Estates Code Section
114.054(b) precludes the creation of a transfer on death deed by an agent,
it does not speak to whether an agent may revoke an already-existing
transfer on death deed.255 To avoid controversy, prudent practice may be
to expressly address this issue in the durable power of attorney.
B. ORAL GIFT OF REAL PROPERTY
After the probate court admitted the testator’s will to probate in Estate
of Wright,256 the purported beneficiary claimed certain property under
two theories. First, the beneficiary claimed that the testator gave him the
property as a gift.257 Second, the beneficiary asserted that the will was
invalid and that he should receive the property under the terms of a dif-
ferent will.258 The trial court held that the testator made “a completed
oral gift” to the purported beneficiary, imposed a constructive trust on
the house, and ordered the trust transferred by a special warranty deed to
the beneficiary.259 The independent executor appealed.260
The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals affirmed.261 The court of
appeals agreed that the testator had gifted the property to the beneficiary
despite the fact that the testator never deeded the property to him.262 The
court of appeals first addressed whether the “Dead Man’s Rule,” Texas
Rule of Evidence 601(b), should have excluded the beneficiary’s testi-
mony about the alleged gift as being the testator’s uncorroborated oral
statements not solicited by an opposing party.263 The court of appeals
determined that the independent executor did not properly object to the
testimony, and thus, regardless of the Rule, the trial court could consider
the evidence.264
The court of appeals next determined that there was sufficient evidence
to prove an oral gift of real property.265 Although it acknowledged that
conveyances of real property should be in writing and signed, the court of
253. Id. at *7.
254. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. ch. 114 (West 2015).
255. See § 114.054(b).
256. 482 S.W.3d 650 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied).
257. Id. at 652–53.
258. Id. at 652.
259. Id. at 655.
260. Id.
261. Id.at 661.
262. Id. at 657–58.
263. Id. at 655.
264. Id. at 656.
265. Id. at 658.
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appeals recognized that, in equity, an oral gift is possible.266 The elements
necessary to prove an oral gift include (1) “a present gift”; (2) the donee’s
possession of the property “with the donor’s consent”; and (3) the do-
nee’s “permanent and valuable improvements . . . with the donor’s con-
sent or other facts [that show] the donee would be defrauded if the gift
were not enforced.”267 The court of appeals believed that evidence that
Leroy lived in the house, paid property insurance, and handled mold
remediation matters with the insurance company was sufficient to sup-
port the finding of an inter vivos gift.268 Despite a strong dissenting opin-
ion, the court rejected the argument that the will showed a future intent
to transfer, which would prevent the oral gift from being effective.269
VI. CONCLUSION
The new cases address a wide array of issues, some are very narrow,
and some have potentially broad impact. This article has already dis-
cussed the practical application of the cases. It is also important to under-
stand some overarching principles that transcend individual cases and
form a pattern. Here are some examples of patterns this author detected:
• In terms of wills, courts continue to interpret narrowly issues sur-
rounding capacity and undue influence and disfavor the use of cir-
cumstantial evidence.270 Courts seem reluctant to consider broader
interpretations due to the potential complications and possible de-
struction of intended autonomy.
• Courts also continue to interpret strictly questions involving Texas
statutes.271
266. Id. at 657.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 658.
269. Id. at 657.
270. See, e.g., Estate of Koontz, No. 04-15-00820-CV, 2016 WL 6775593, at *2 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio Nov. 16, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re Estate of Kam, 484 S.W.3d
642, 652 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, pet. filed); In re Estate of Parrimore, No. 14-14-00820-
CV, 2016 WL 750293, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 25, 2016, no pet.) (mem.
op.).
271. See, e.g., In re Jacky, 506 S.W.3d 550, 555–56 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016,
orig. proceeding); In re Davidson, 485 S.W.3d 927, 930–31 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2016, orig.
proceeding); Anderson v. Archer, 490 S.W.3d 175, 178 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, pet.
filed).
